Arbeitspapier

Double Taxation, Tax Credits and the Information Exchange Puzzle

This paper analyzes the choice of taxes and international information exchange by governments in a capital tax competition model. We explain situations where countries can choose tax rates on tax savings income and exchange information about the domestic savings of foreigners, implying that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. However, we also identify situations with adverse welfare properties in which information exchange is compatible with zero taxes on capital income. The model helps to identify the linkage between voluntary information exchange and the choice of tax rates. It is shown that the recent development in information exchange treaties may not be useful to overcome the inefficiencies caused by decentralized tax setting.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CoFE Discussion Paper ; No. 03/06

Classification
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Subject
withholding tax
tax credit
international tax competition
information exchange
Doppelbesteuerung
Steuerbegünstigung
Steuerwettbewerb
Kapitalertragsteuer
Informationsverhalten
Theorie
Informationsaustausch

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eggert, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)
(where)
Konstanz
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eggert, Wolfgang
  • University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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