Arbeitspapier

Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages, and Involuntary Unemployment

Recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders, yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage. We consider a model where the starting wage for outsiders may be lower than the insider wage, but incentive constraints associated with turnover affect the form of the contract. We examine under what conditions the starting wage is linked to the insider wage so that increased bargaining power of insiders raises the starting wage and reduces hiring of outsiders.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Labor Demand
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Thema
starting wage
bargain
seniority
unemployment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gottfries, Nils
Sjöström, Tomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gottfries, Nils
  • Sjöström, Tomas
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1999

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