Arbeitspapier
Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages, and Involuntary Unemployment
Recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders, yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage. We consider a model where the starting wage for outsiders may be lower than the insider wage, but incentive constraints associated with turnover affect the form of the contract. We examine under what conditions the starting wage is linked to the insider wage so that increased bargaining power of insiders raises the starting wage and reduces hiring of outsiders.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Demand
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Thema
-
starting wage
bargain
seniority
unemployment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gottfries, Nils
Sjöström, Tomas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gottfries, Nils
- Sjöström, Tomas
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1999