The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States

Arbeitspapier

In 2006, the reform of the German fiscal constitution realigned legislative powers between the federal and the state governments. Since 2007, the German state governments have been allowed to design real estate transfer tax rates. We investigate whether government ideology predicts the levels and increases in the real estate transfer tax rates; and show that leftwing and center governments were more active in increasing the real estate transfer tax rates than rightwing governments. The result is important because many voters were disenchanted with the policies and platforms of the established German parties in the course of the euro and refugee crisis. Disenchantment notwithstanding, the established political parties are still prepared to offer polarized policies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6491

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General ; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; Capitalist Systems: Political Economy ; Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy
• Subject: taxation ; real estate transfer tax ; reform ; partisan politics ; government ideology ; German states

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Krause, Manuela ; Potrafke, Niklas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167477
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET