Artikel

Cheat to win: How to hack tournament theory

It may be surprising that one of the most popular compensation schemes in business is so open to being hacked - to having managers cheat to win. We explore tournament theory to detail its vulnerabilities to various forms of cheating unilateral and multilateral. We identify who is most likely to be involved and under what conditions. We describe the costs to the victims, to the firm, and to society. We outline the possible strategic effects - in terms of firm performance. And, we discuss possible ways to address these vulnerabilities to the schemes we rely on to motivate managers to put in the right efforts, to take the right risks, and to lead the right way.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: BRQ Business Research Quarterly ; ISSN: 2340-9436 ; Volume: 22 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 216-225 ; Barcelona: Elsevier España

Klassifikation
Management
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Thema
Cheating
Managerial compensation schemes
Tournament theory
Vulnerabilities

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Arend, Richard J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier España
(wo)
Barcelona
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.brq.2018.10.003
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Arend, Richard J.
  • Elsevier España

Entstanden

  • 2019

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