Arbeitspapier

Cooperation is relative: Income and framing effects with public goods

In social dilemmas, there is tension between cooperation that promotes the common good and the pursuit of individual interests. International climate change negotiations provide one example: although abatement costs are borne by individual countries, the benefits are shared globally. We study a multi-period, threshold public goods game with unequally endowed participants and communication in which the decision variable is framed in three seemingly inconsequential ways: as absolute contributions, contributions relative to endowments and in terms of the effects of contributions on final payoffs. We find considerable agreement that rich (or high endowed) persons contribute more than poor (or low endowed) individuals at levels that are invariant across frames. Frames do, however, significantly affect both preferred and actual contributions for the poor: they contribute significantly less when the decision variable makes the effects on final payoffs salient than when it is framed in terms of absolute contributions. Contributions are explained mostly by self-interest, justice preferences, and experiencing failed negotiations, but we find no effects of reciprocity toward individuals or of the suggestions of others about what one should contribute.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 16/2012

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Public Goods
Thema
Public good game
threshold
communication
fairness
endowment heterogeneity
Öffentliche Güter
Kooperation
Spieltheorie
Altruismus
Gerechtigkeit

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brekke, Kjell Arne
Konow, James
Nyborg, Karine
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brekke, Kjell Arne
  • Konow, James
  • Nyborg, Karine
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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