Does female empowerment promote economic development?

Arbeitspapier

Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? We develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. We then assess the policy implications of these models. We find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5637

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination ; Economic Development: General
• Thema: female empowerment ; gender equality ; development ; theory of the household ; marital bargaining ; Frauenpolitik ; Entwicklungshilfe ; Fraueneinkommen ; Entwicklung ; Familienökonomik ; Haushaltsökonomik ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Ehe ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Doepke, Matthias ; Tertilt, Michèle
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51700
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104134490
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ