Arbeitspapier

Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment

In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. We elicit the second subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's action; second ("posterior" belief.), after he observes his private signal. Our main result is that the second subjects weigh the private signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their first belief; they overweight the signal when it contradicts their first belief. This way of updating, incompatible with Bayesianism, can be explained by multiple priors on the predecessor's rationality and a generalization of the Maximum Likelihood Updating rule. In another experiment, we directly test this theory and find support for it.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: cemmap working paper ; No. CWP39/18

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
De Filippis, Roberta
Guarinno, Antonio
Jehiel, Philippe
Kitagawa, Toru
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
(where)
London
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2018.3918
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • De Filippis, Roberta
  • Guarinno, Antonio
  • Jehiel, Philippe
  • Kitagawa, Toru
  • Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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