- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-6938
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study ; day:24 ; month:2 ; year:2017 ; pages:1-17
Experimental economics ; (24.2.2017), 1-17
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
-
Fiala, Lenka
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Suetens, Sigrid
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s10683-017-9517-4
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:1111-201703182710
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 15.03.2024, 23:52 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Fiala, Lenka
- Suetens, Sigrid
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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