Arbeitspapier

For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing

Why do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherin a state's representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversify his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state's level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state's initial income and growth rate is lower. A test of the model's predictions, using cross-sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, suggests that there is broad support for a risk sharing motive for marriage as well as for a precautionary savings motive.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 702

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
consumption insurance
marriage

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chami, Ralph
Hess, Gregory D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chami, Ralph
  • Hess, Gregory D.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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