Arbeitspapier
For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing
Why do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherin a state's representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversify his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state's level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state's initial income and growth rate is lower. A test of the model's predictions, using cross-sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, suggests that there is broad support for a risk sharing motive for marriage as well as for a precautionary savings motive.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 702
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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consumption insurance
marriage
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Chami, Ralph
Hess, Gregory D.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Chami, Ralph
- Hess, Gregory D.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2002