Arbeitspapier

For Better and for Worse - How Unpaid Bride Wealth provides Security

The obligation to pay bride wealth at marriage is usually associated with thecontinuation of the lineage or considered a compensation for the loss of laborfor the family that provides the bride. In this paper a different interpretationis advanced. The obligation to pay of bride wealth is seen as informal insurancewhich relies on the fact that bride wealth liabilities are contingent claims.Empirical evidence from Zimbabwe is presented to support this claim. In theabsence of formal insurance mechanisms, bride wealth qualifies as an importantsecurity enhancing institution: the arrangement covers nearly the completeZimbabwean adult population and permits to pool risks between many differentfamilies. Additionally the amounts involved are large and the period of timeduring which the claims provide security long. Like any informal insurancearrangement, the marriage system is prone to failure as a result of covariantrisk and information and enforcement problems. It is shown how the marriageprocedure deals with these problems.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-079/2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Agricultural Finance
Thema
Risk
Insurance
Institutions
Bride Wealth
Africa
Familienökonomik
Afrika

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hoogeveen, Hans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hoogeveen, Hans
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2000

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