Arbeitspapier

Linear-quadratic-singular stochastic differential games and applications

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is quadratic in the state and linear in the control. We call these games linear-quadratic-singular stochastic differential games. Under natural assumptions, we show the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria, which are characterized through a linear system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The proof is based on an approximation via a sequence of games in which players are restricted to play Lipschitz continuous strategies. We then discuss an application of these results to a model of capacity expansion in oligopoly markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 678

Klassifikation
Mathematik
Thema
Singular stochastic control
linear quadratic games
stochastic maximum principle
Nash equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dianetti, Jodi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(wo)
Bielefeld
(wann)
2023

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29786777
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dianetti, Jodi
  • Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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