Arbeitspapier

Credit risk transfers and the macroeconomy

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the 'originate to distribute' model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmström and Tirole [28] and Parlour and Plantin [39] and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the effect of productivity and other macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation. By offering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more risk.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2010/26

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Credit Risk Transfer
Dual Moral Hazard
Monetary Policy
Liquidity
Welfare

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Faia, Ester
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2010

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-87147
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Faia, Ester
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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