When to regulate airports: A simple rule

Arbeitspapier

Landing fees at airports are regulated almost all over the world since airports are assumed to abuse their market power. We find that monopolistic airports have an incentive to restrain landing fees when they generate additional non-aviation revenues and that the optimal landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, we show that monopolistic airports will not have an incentive to abuse their market power anymore so that a price regulation becomes inappropriate as soon as non-aviation revenues increase above 50% of all airport revenues.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Department Working Paper Series ; No. 6

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Air Transportation ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: airport regulation ; aviation and non-aviation revenues ; complementarity of aviation and non-aviation ; locational rents

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kratzsch, Uwe ; Sieg, Gernot
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (where): Braunschweig
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51321
• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-25406
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET