Arbeitspapier

The Optimal Graduated Minimum Wage and Social Welfare

This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a graduated minimum wage in a model with optimal income taxation in which a government seeks to maximize social welfare. It shows that the optimal graduated minimum wage increases social welfare by increasing the low productivity workers’ consumption and bringing it closer to the first-best. The paper also describes how the graduated minimum wage in a social welfare optimum depends on important economy characteristics such as the government’s revenue needs, the social-welfare weight of low-productivity workers, and the numbers and productivities of the different types of workers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 188

Classification
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Subject
Graduated minimum wage
optimal income taxation
social welfare

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Danziger, Eliav
Danziger, Leif
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
(where)
Maastricht
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Danziger, Eliav
  • Danziger, Leif
  • Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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