Endogenous institutions: The case of U.S. Congressional redistricting

Arbeitspapier

We measure where and to what end parties take control of Congressional redistricting, which lets them redraw districts to favor their own candidates. We exploit the discontinuous change in a party's control of redistricting triggered when its share of seats in the state legislature exceeds 50 percent. Parties capture redistricting in states where they have suffered recent losses, which are temporarily reversed by redistricting. Opposition candidates are 11 percentage points less likely to win House elections just after redistricting. Consistent with recent Supreme Court rulings, African Americans are more likely to be segregated into overwhelmingly black districts under Republican redistricting.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 742

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jeong, Dahyeon ; Shenoy, Ajay
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of California, Economics Department
• (wo): Santa Cruz, CA
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197758
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ