Arbeitspapier
Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game
We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2012-18
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Public Goods
- Thema
-
voluntary contribution mechanism
public goods experiments
learning
limited information
confusion
conditional cooperation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bayer, Ralph-C.
Renner, Elke
Sausgruber, Rupert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (wo)
-
Nottingham
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bayer, Ralph-C.
- Renner, Elke
- Sausgruber, Rupert
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Entstanden
- 2012
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games
Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games
Confusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods games
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions
Voluntary contributions 'vote out' public ones
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Matching subsidies and voluntary contributions: A review
The role of cultural capital on the voluntary contributions to cultural goods: A differential game approach
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1846
Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games
Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games
Confusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods games
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions
Voluntary contributions 'vote out' public ones
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Matching subsidies and voluntary contributions: A review
The role of cultural capital on the voluntary contributions to cultural goods: A differential game approach
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1846
Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games
Confusion and Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Public Goods Games
Confusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods games
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions
Voluntary contributions 'vote out' public ones
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Matching subsidies and voluntary contributions: A review
The role of cultural capital on the voluntary contributions to cultural goods: A differential game approach
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'