Political Institutions and Income (Re-)Distribution: Evidence from Developed Economies

Arbeitspapier

We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4382

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions ; Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Comparative Economic Systems: General
• Subject: redistribution ; formal institutions ; fiscal decentralization ; presidential and parliamentary regimes ; electoral systems

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Feld, Lars P. ; Schnellenbach, Jan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84165
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET