Artikel

Appointing high-court judges by political parties

This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and theirmandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by a weighted lottery, related to the shares in Parliament of the different parties.We show that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem under reasonable conditions and implementing a politically balanced solution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 91-99 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Negotiation
Political competition
Random protocols
Legislative bargaining

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Porteiro, Nicolás
Villar, Antonio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-014-0118-6
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Porteiro, Nicolás
  • Villar, Antonio
  • Springer

Entstanden

  • 2015

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