Arbeitspapier
Natural Disasters, Moral Hazard, and Special Interests in Congress
We exploit the precise timing of natural disasters to provide empirical evidence on the connection between electoral accountability and politicians’ support for special interests. We show that, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the evening news substantially reduce their coverage of politics. At the very same time, members of Congress become more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Our findings are consistent with standard theories of political agency, according to which politicians are more inclined to serve special interests when, for exogenous reasons, they are less intensely monitored.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7408
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
natural disasters
moral hazard
toll-call voting
special interests
Congress
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kaplan, Ethan
Spenkuch, Jörg L.
Yuan, Haishan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kaplan, Ethan
- Spenkuch, Jörg L.
- Yuan, Haishan
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018