Arbeitspapier

Natural Disasters, Moral Hazard, and Special Interests in Congress

We exploit the precise timing of natural disasters to provide empirical evidence on the connection between electoral accountability and politicians’ support for special interests. We show that, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the evening news substantially reduce their coverage of politics. At the very same time, members of Congress become more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Our findings are consistent with standard theories of political agency, according to which politicians are more inclined to serve special interests when, for exogenous reasons, they are less intensely monitored.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7408

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
natural disasters
moral hazard
toll-call voting
special interests
Congress

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kaplan, Ethan
Spenkuch, Jörg L.
Yuan, Haishan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kaplan, Ethan
  • Spenkuch, Jörg L.
  • Yuan, Haishan
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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