Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation rather than Fines

Arbeitspapier

We analyze motivations for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). With regard to the former, we identify domestic policy failures and various cross-country spillover effects; with regard to the latter, we contrast an economic-theory perspective on optimal corrective measures with the legalistic perspective adopted in the SGP. We discuss the advantages of replacing the Pact's rigid rules backed by fines with corrective taxes (as far as spillover effects are concerned) and procedural rules and limited delegation of fiscal powers (as far as domestic policy failures are concerned). This would not only enhance the efficiency of the Pact, but also render it easier to enforce.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 633

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy ; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General
• Thema: Stability and Growth Pact ; Spillover Effects ; Policy Failures ; Pigouvian Taxes ; Policy Delegation ; Reform ; Finanzpolitik ; Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik ; Spillover-Effekt ; Internalisierung externer Effekte ; Theorie ; EU-Staaten ; Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lindbeck, Assar ; Niepelt, Dirk
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81197
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ