Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and that any singleton farsighted stable set with common expectations is a farsighted stable set with heterogeneous expectations. We characterize singleton farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as singleton farsighted stable sets.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 31.2017

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Farsighted Stable Sets ; Heterogeneous Expectations ; One-to-one Matching ; Voting ; Effectivity Functions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bloch, Francis ; van den Nouweland, Anne
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/177225
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET