Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market

Arbeitspapier

In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. First, in an audit study of employers by a blinded worker, we find that working only for good employers yields 40% higher wages. Second, in an experiment that varied reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9501

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices ; Labor Contracts ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Contract Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Thema: labor ; personnel ; contracts ; online labor markets ; job search ; screening ; reputation ; online ratings

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Benson, Alan ; Sojourner, Aaron J. ; Umyarov, Akhmed
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125029
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ