Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market

Arbeitspapier

In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. First, in an audit study of employers by a blinded worker, we find that working only for good employers yields 40% higher wages. Second, in an experiment that varied reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9501

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices ; Labor Contracts ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Contract Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: labor ; personnel ; contracts ; online labor markets ; job search ; screening ; reputation ; online ratings

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Benson, Alan ; Sojourner, Aaron J. ; Umyarov, Akhmed
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125029
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET