Arbeitspapier
Optimal Combinations of Income Tax and Subsidies for Education
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) find that progressive taxation of labour income is optimal when capital income is taxed. This paper shows that their main result still holds when introducing endogenous choice of occupation, individuals with non- pecuniary preferences for one type of occupation, and tuition fees into the model, provided the subsidy rate for tuition in the high skill occupation is not too low. However, a new result in this paper state that efficiency can be reached when labour income tax is proportional and capital income is taxed, provided that the rates of subsidies for tuition are lower than the labour income tax rate.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 313
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
- Thema
-
Optimal income taxation
Human capital investments
Subsidies for tuition
Skill formation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bjertnæs, Geir Haakon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Statistics Norway, Research Department
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bjertnæs, Geir Haakon
- Statistics Norway, Research Department
Entstanden
- 2001
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