District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority's Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes

Arbeitspapier

Members of parliament have more effective incentives to cater for the majority's preferences when they are elected in districts with few seats in parliament rather than in districts with many seats. We empirically investigate this hypothesis by matching voting behavior on legislative proposals of Swiss members of parliament with real referenda outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. This quasi-experimental data allows us to identify the impact of electoral systems through district magnitude on how members of parliament represent citizens' preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that members of parliament from districts with few seats vote along the majority's preferences.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2010-13

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Public Economics: General
• Thema: Median Voter ; Political Economy ; Electoral Systems

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Portmann, Marco ; Stadelmann, David ; Eichenberger, Reiner
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214471
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ