To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game

Arbeitspapier

We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Wellesley College Working Paper ; No. 2003-02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations ; Öffentliches Gut ; Spieltheorie ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Chaudhuri, Ananish ; Chen, DeeDee ; Graziano, Sara ; McIntire, Frances ; Winkler, Dawn
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wellesley College, Department of Economics
• (where): Wellesley, MA
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET