The Political Economy of Corporate Tax Harmonization: Why Do European Politicians (Dis)like Minimum Tax Rates?

Arbeitspapier

Setting minimum tax rates is a well discussed way of mitigating pressure from tax competition. This paper investigates which motives shape the support for a minimum corporate tax among politicians. We make use of a unique data base: a survey among members of the European parliament. Our results confirm that the politicians' ideology as well as individual characteristics such as educational background exert a major in uence. Moreover, several predictions regarding national interests are derived from various standard tax competition models. These hypotheses are partly supported by the data; in particular, different national preferences for social equality shape the support. A comparison with survey results from the German Bundestag reveals that German politicians on the national level do not show different preferences towards tax rate harmonization.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 08-108

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: company taxation ; tax harmonization ; political economy ; European Parliament ; Körperschaftsteuer ; Unternehmensbesteuerung ; EU-Steuerrecht ; Steuerharmonisierung ; Public Choice ; EU-Staaten ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Osterloh, Steffen ; Heinemann, Friedrich
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27591
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET