Lessons we should have learned from the global financial crisis but didn't

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, I first quickly recount the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis (GFC). Of course, the triggering event was the unfolding of the subprime crisis; however, I argue that the financial system was already so fragile that just about anything could have caused the collapse. I then move on to an assessment of the lessons we should have learned. Briefly, these include: (a) the GFC was not a liquidity crisis, (b) underwriting matters, (c) unregulated and unsupervised financial institutions naturally evolve into control frauds, and (d) the worst part is the cover-up of the crimes. I argue that we cannot resolve the crisis until we begin going after the fraud. Finally, I outline an agenda for reform, along the lines suggested by the work of Hyman P. Minsky.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 681

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; General Aggregative Models: Marxian; Sraffian; Kaleckian ; General Aggregative Models: Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian ; Business Fluctuations; Cycles ; Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; Financial Crises ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
• Thema: global financial crisis ; subprime crisis ; Hyman P. Minsky ; Galbraith and the Great Crash ; control fraud ; underwriting ; deregulation ; financial reform

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Wray, L. Randall
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
• (wo): Annandale-on-Hudson, NY
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56996
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ