Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology
Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit costs of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit costs is available at no extra cost. They thereby commit themselves credibly to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction. (author's abstract)
- Extent
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Seite(n): 22
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (92-19)
- Subject
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Ökologie
Ökologie und Umwelt
Welt
Umweltbelastung
Technologie
Entscheidung
Strategie
Industriestaat
Kosten
Umweltschutz
Klimaschutz
ökonomische Faktoren
Emission
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Konrad, Kai A.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
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Deutschland, München
- (when)
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1992
- Handle
- Last update
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21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 1992
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Private provision of public goods by firms
Bidding in hierarchies
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Inverse campaigning