Arbeitspapier
Time-consistent carbon pricing: The role of carbon contracts for differences
Carbon pricing decisions by governments are prone to time-inconsistency, which causes the private sector to underinvest in emission-reducing technologies. We show that incentives for decarbonization can be improved if complementing carbon pricing with carbon contracts for differences, where the government commits to pay a fixed carbon price level to the investors. We derive conditions under which the government is willing to "tie its hands" with the contracts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1859
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Economics of Regulation
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Carbon pricing
Time-inconsistency
Green technology
Climate policy
Carbon contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chiappinelli, Olga
Neuhoff, Karsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chiappinelli, Olga
- Neuhoff, Karsten
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2020