Arbeitspapier

Caught in the trap? The disincentive effect of social assistance

While financial incentives usually have a significant effect on the labor supply of married women and single mothers, the evidence about the participation elasticity of childless singles, and single males especially, is more scant. This is, however, important in countries like France and Germany, where single individuals constitute the core of social assistance recipients. As yet, there is no conclusive evidence about whether, and to what extent, this group is affected by the financial disincentives embedded in the generous redistributive programs in place in these countries. In this paper, we exploit a particular feature of the main welfare scheme in France (Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, RMI), namely that childless adults under age 25 are not eligible for it. Using a regression discontinuity approach and the French micro-census data, we find that the RMI reduces the employment of uneducated single men by 7%-10%. Important policy implications are drawn.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4291

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
Thema
Regression discontinuity
welfare
social assistance
labor supply
Soziale Mindestsicherung
Arbeitsangebot
Männer
Alleinlebende
Schätzung
Frankreich

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bargain, Olivier
Doorley, Karina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2009

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090824192
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bargain, Olivier
  • Doorley, Karina
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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