Bericht

Forbearance, resolution and deposit insurance

The report discusses a variety of issues involving difficulties in the banking sector, with a view to ascertaining the appropriate institutional infrastructure in the context of the European Union and the euro area. Forbearance on the part of banks dealing with delinquent borrowers is problematic if it is designed as a way to game creditors and supervisors. Supervisors should not tolerate excessive forbearance; failure to intervene early tends to increase the costs of the crisis. Macro-prudential concerns should not induce the authorities to delay clean-ups of banks in difficulties. To minimise the macroeconomic fallout from banking problems and to reduce the temptation for authorities to delay and hide problems in banking, it is necessary to have a viable resolution regime that leaves room for authorities to reduce the systemic fallout from resolution. The Advisory Scientific Committee calls for the establishment of strong European bodies responsible for banking supervision and bank resolution. A European competence is necessary to ensure that cross-border concerns are given appropriate weight in supervision and resolution.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Reports of the Advisory Scientific Committee ; No. 1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Subject
loan forbearance
bank resolution
bank regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hellwig, Martin F.
Sapir, André
Pagano, Marco
Acharya, Viral V.
Balcerowicz, Leszek
Boot, Arnoud
Brunnermeier, Markus K.
Buch, Claudia
van den Burg, Ieke
Calomiris, Charles
Gros, Daniel
Focarelli, Dario
Giovannini, Alberto
Ittner, Andreas
Schoenmaker, Dirk
Wyplosz, Charles
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Bericht

Associated

  • Hellwig, Martin F.
  • Sapir, André
  • Pagano, Marco
  • Acharya, Viral V.
  • Balcerowicz, Leszek
  • Boot, Arnoud
  • Brunnermeier, Markus K.
  • Buch, Claudia
  • van den Burg, Ieke
  • Calomiris, Charles
  • Gros, Daniel
  • Focarelli, Dario
  • Giovannini, Alberto
  • Ittner, Andreas
  • Schoenmaker, Dirk
  • Wyplosz, Charles
  • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision

Time of origin

  • 2012

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