Arbeitspapier

Do rights to resistance discipline the elites? An experiment on the threat of overthrow

The threat of overthrow stabilizes a constitution because it disciplines the elites. This is the main rationale behind rights to resistance. In this paper, we test this conjecture experimentally. We model a society in which players can produce wealth by solving a coordination problem. Coordination is facilitated through a pre-game status-ranking. Compliance with the status hierarchy yields an efficient yet inequitable payoff distribution, in which a player's wealth is determined by her pre-game status. Between treatments, we vary (a) whether overthrows - which reset the status-ranking via collective disobedience - are possible or not, and (b) whether voluntary redistributive transfers - which high-status players can use to appease the low-status players - are available or not. In contrast to established thinking we find that, on average, the threat of overthrow does not have a stabilizing effect as high-status players fail to provide sufficient redistribution to prevent overthrows. However, if an overthrow brings generous players into high-status positions, groups stabilize and prosper. This suggests an alternative rationale for rights to resistance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2020/27

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Subject
rights to resistance
civil resistance
constitutional stability
redistribution
coordination
battle of the sexes
experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chatziathanasiou, Konstantin
Hippel, Svenja
Kurschilgen, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chatziathanasiou, Konstantin
  • Hippel, Svenja
  • Kurschilgen, Michael
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Time of origin

  • 2020

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