Arbeitspapier
Do rights to resistance discipline the elites? An experiment on the threat of overthrow
The threat of overthrow stabilizes a constitution because it disciplines the elites. This is the main rationale behind rights to resistance. In this paper, we test this conjecture experimentally. We model a society in which players can produce wealth by solving a coordination problem. Coordination is facilitated through a pre-game status-ranking. Compliance with the status hierarchy yields an efficient yet inequitable payoff distribution, in which a player's wealth is determined by her pre-game status. Between treatments, we vary (a) whether overthrows - which reset the status-ranking via collective disobedience - are possible or not, and (b) whether voluntary redistributive transfers - which high-status players can use to appease the low-status players - are available or not. In contrast to established thinking we find that, on average, the threat of overthrow does not have a stabilizing effect as high-status players fail to provide sufficient redistribution to prevent overthrows. However, if an overthrow brings generous players into high-status positions, groups stabilize and prosper. This suggests an alternative rationale for rights to resistance.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2020/27
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Subject
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rights to resistance
civil resistance
constitutional stability
redistribution
coordination
battle of the sexes
experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Chatziathanasiou, Konstantin
Hippel, Svenja
Kurschilgen, Michael
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Chatziathanasiou, Konstantin
- Hippel, Svenja
- Kurschilgen, Michael
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2020