Arbeitspapier
Moral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior?
We conduct an experiment where subjects are matched in groups of three and vote on a moral transgression. Analyzing different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it. This effect persists when considering pivotal votes only, which eliminates opportunities to save on own moral costs and to rely instead on sufficiently many votes for the transgression by other group members. A series of novel treatments allows us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of voting behavior.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13383
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
group decisions
unethical behavior
experiment
voting
diffusion of responsibility
guilt sharing
donations
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Feess, Eberhard
Kerzenmacher, Florian
Muehlheusser, Gerd
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Feess, Eberhard
- Kerzenmacher, Florian
- Muehlheusser, Gerd
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2020
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