Konferenzbeitrag
Capacity constrained price competition with transportation costs
We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria in case of capacity constrained price competition, transportation costs and customer-specific pricing. Equilibrium prices weakly increase in the distance between supplier and customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, the firms exclusively their serve home markets. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of more distant customers to suppliers. Even ex-post subcontracts may restore efficiency only partly.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Industrial Organisation Theory I ; No. B03-V2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Muthers, Johannes
Hunold, Matthias
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Muthers, Johannes
- Hunold, Matthias
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2017
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