Does Collateral Reduce Loan-Size Credit Rationing? Survey Evidence

Arbeitspapier

In theory, the use of collateral in credit contracting should mitigate the information problems that are widely held to be the primary cause of credit rationing. However, direct empirical evidence of the link between collateral use and credit rationing is scant. This paper examines the relationship between collateral and credit rationing using survey data that provides clean measures of quantity and loan size rationing. We find that selection problems arising from the loan application process and co-determination of loan terms significantly influence the link between collateral and rationing. Accounting for these problems, our results suggest that collateral reduces the likelihood of experiencing loan-size credit rationing by between 15 and 40 percentage points, and that collateral also decreases the relative loan amount rationed.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:36

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Corporate Finance and Governance: Other
• Thema: Loan-Size rationing ; Collateral ; Small business ; Information asymmetry

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chala, Alemu Tulu ; Forssbaeck, Jens
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260265
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ