Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium and inefficiency in fixed rate tenders

The fixed rate tender is one of the main procedural formats relied upon by central banks in their implementation of monetary policy. This fact stands in a somewhat puzzling contrast to the prevalent view in the theoretical literature that the procedure, by fixing interest rate and quantity at the same time, does not allow a strategic equilibrium. We show that an equilibrium exists under general conditions even if bidders expect true demand to exceed supply on average. The outcome is typically inefficient. It is argued that the fixed rate tender, in comparison to other tender formats, may be an appropriate instrument for central bank liquidity management when market conditions are sufficiently calm.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 554

Classification
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Monetary Policy
Subject
equilibrium
Fixed rate tenders
inefficiency
rationing
Offenmarktpolitik
Zinspolitik
Auktionstheorie
Ungleichgewichtsökonomie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ewerhart, Christian
Cassola, Nuno
Valla, Natacha
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Cassola, Nuno
  • Valla, Natacha
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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