Arbeitspapier

Unemployment insurance in high informality countries

Providing unemployment insurance is particularly problematic in countries with high informality because workers can claim unemployment benefits and work in the informal sector at the same time. This paper proposes a method to evaluate alternative schemes to provide insurance for unemployed individuals. First, it presents an economy that can be calibrated to reproduce key features of the economy for which the reform will be evaluated. Then, it shows how the implementation of an unemployment insurance savings account (UISA) scheme can be evaluated. The method is applied to Mexico, and the results show how the UISA scheme would eliminate incentives for participation in the informal sector. The implementation of the UISA would imply large welfare gains from the ex-ante perspective.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IDB Working Paper Series ; No. IDB-WP-403

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Social Security and Public Pensions
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
Unemployment
insurance
Mexico
informality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Espino, Emilio
Sanchez, Juan M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
(wo)
Washington, DC
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Espino, Emilio
  • Sanchez, Juan M.
  • Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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