Arbeitspapier

Wages and informality in developing countries

It is often argued that informal labor markets in developing countries promote growth by reducing the impact of regulation. On the other hand informality may reduce the amount of social protection offered to workers. We extend the wage-posting framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to allow heterogeneous firms to decide whether to locate in the formal or the informal sector, as well as set wages. Workers engage in both off the job and on the job search. We estimate the model using Brazilian micro data and evaluate the labo market and welfare effects of policies towards informality.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper ; No. 1018

Classification
Wirtschaft
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Subject
Informality
Unemployment
Job Search
Wage Posting
Equilibrium wage distributions
On the Job Search
Method of Moments
Informality
Unemployment
Job Search
Wage Posting
Equilibrium wage distributions
On the Job Search
Method of Moments

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Meghir, Costas
Narita, Renata
Robin, Jean-Marc
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Yale University, Economic Growth Center
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Meghir, Costas
  • Narita, Renata
  • Robin, Jean-Marc
  • Yale University, Economic Growth Center

Time of origin

  • 2012

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