Arbeitspapier
Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 500
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
Symmetric two-player games
zero-sum games
Rock-Paper-Scissors
single-peakedness
quasiconcavity
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Mathematik
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Jörg
Schipper, Burkhard C.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.11588/heidok.00010545
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-105453
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Duersch, Peter
- Oechssler, Jörg
- Schipper, Burkhard C.
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010