Arbeitspapier

Preparation and toolkit learning

A product set of pure strategies is a prep set (prep is short for preparation) if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 485

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
noncooperative games
inertia
status quo bias
adaptive play
procedural rationality
Spieltheorie
Adaptive Erwartung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Voorneveld, Mark
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Voorneveld, Mark
  • Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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