Arbeitspapier

Cash-in-hand, benefit fraud and unemployment insurance

Recent evidence questions the nature of the re-employment spike as unemployment insurance (UI) payments expire. Unemployed agents do not appear to devote more time to search and are observed leaving the UI scheme early without necessarily entering employment. We show that benefit fraud is consistent with both observations. Over time, UI recipients become increasingly willing to accept short-term cash-in-hand work. This takes them away from job search. Im- mediately before UI expiry, the risk of punishment for fraud exceeds the value of remaining payments. Recipients may voluntarily leave the scheme to accept cash-in-hand opportunities.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2015/4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Informal Labor Markets
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
Cash-in-hand
Benefit fraud
Unemployment insurance
Re-employment spike

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Long, Ian W.
Polito, Vito
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
11.04.3025, 00:26 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Long, Ian W.
  • Polito, Vito
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)