Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

An agency model to explain trade credit policy and empirical evidence

This paper explains trade credit policy based on the agency theory. According to this theory we have developed an agency model based on the adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena arising from the relation between sellers and buyers. This model has been estimated by using panel data methodology applied to UK companies. Our findings strongly support the model proposed. We find that smaller firms, those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets, and those that are less profitable extend more trade credit, whereas firms with a high proportion of variable costs and high percentage of bad debts extend less.

An agency model to explain trade credit policy and empirical evidence

Urheber*in: Pindado, Julio; Bastos, Rafael Rabelo

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Umfang
Seite(n): 2631-2642
Sprache
Englisch
Anmerkungen
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Erschienen in
Applied Economics, 39(20)

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pindado, Julio
Bastos, Rafael Rabelo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wann)
2008

DOI
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-239626
Rechteinformation
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Letzte Aktualisierung
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ

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Objekttyp

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Beteiligte

  • Pindado, Julio
  • Bastos, Rafael Rabelo

Entstanden

  • 2008

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