Moving between welfare payments: The case of sickness insurance for the unemployed

Arbeitspapier

This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness with sickness insurance (SI), using a grouped proportional hazard duration model and 9 years of monthly panel data. The combination of duration-limited UI and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to apply for SI, which is strongest immediately before UI expires. Estimation shows that the sickness hazard increases by around 50% when UI is about to end. Data on the sickness spells reveal that those who were given SI shortly before UI expired, are more likely to fully exploit the maximum of 12 months SI.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2006,04

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Subject: Unemployment insurance ; sickness insurance ; unemployment duration ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ; Norwegen ; Statistische Bestandsanalyse

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Henningsen, Morten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63043
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET