Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Artikel

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 394-412 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Thema: public goods ; experiment ; framing ; cooperation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cox, Caleb A. ; Stoddard, Brock
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g6040394
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167952
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ