Arbeitspapier

'Thou shalt not covet ...': prohibitions, temptation and moral values

We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non- monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,54

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Thema
Prohibitions
Temptation
Self-Control
Moral Values
Crime

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cervellati, Matteo
Vanin, Paolo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cervellati, Matteo
  • Vanin, Paolo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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