Arbeitspapier

'Thou shalt not covet ...': prohibitions, temptation and moral values

We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non- monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,54

Classification
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Subject
Prohibitions
Temptation
Self-Control
Moral Values
Crime

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cervellati, Matteo
Vanin, Paolo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cervellati, Matteo
  • Vanin, Paolo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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