Competition between state universities

Arbeitspapier

We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3373

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Education ; Educational Finance; Financial Aid ; Higher Education; Research Institutions
• Subject: university competition ; research ; tuition fees ; Hochschule ; Wettbewerb ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Hochschulforschung ; Hochschullehre ; Dienstleistungsqualität ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Luporini, Lisa ; Grazzini, Annalisa ; Petretto, Alessandro
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46254
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET