Arbeitspapier

Competition between state universities

We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3373

Classification
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Subject
university competition
research
tuition fees
Hochschule
Wettbewerb
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Hochschulforschung
Hochschullehre
Dienstleistungsqualität
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Luporini, Lisa
Grazzini, Annalisa
Petretto, Alessandro
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Luporini, Lisa
  • Grazzini, Annalisa
  • Petretto, Alessandro
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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