Arbeitspapier
Competition between state universities
We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of research and teaching supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability students attending each university. The most efficient equilibrium results in the creation of an élite institution attended only by high-ability students who enjoy a higher teaching quality but pay higher tuition fees.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3373
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Higher Education; Research Institutions
- Subject
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university competition
research
tuition fees
Hochschule
Wettbewerb
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Hochschulforschung
Hochschullehre
Dienstleistungsqualität
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Luporini, Lisa
Grazzini, Annalisa
Petretto, Alessandro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2011
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Luporini, Lisa
- Grazzini, Annalisa
- Petretto, Alessandro
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2011