Arbeitspapier
The perils of peer punishment: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
We provide experimental evidence on the effects of social disapproval by peers among communities of Uruguayan small-scale fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We combined this treatment with an in-group (groups from a single community) / mixed group (groups composed of fishers from different communities) treatment. We find that mixed groups, unlike in-groups, reduce their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment. Both in in-groups and mixed groups there is substantial antisocial punishment, which leads to increased extraction of the CPR by those who are unfairly punished. These findings indicate that effective peer punishment requires coordination to prevent antisocial targeting and to clarify the social signal conveyed by punishment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2015-12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Field Experiments
- Thema
-
social disapproval
social preferences
common pool resource
desaprobación social
preferencias sociales
recurso de uso común
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
de Melo, Gioia
Piaggio, Matías
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Banco de México
- (wo)
-
Ciudad de México
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- de Melo, Gioia
- Piaggio, Matías
- Banco de México
Entstanden
- 2015