Arbeitspapier

The perils of peer punishment: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment

We provide experimental evidence on the effects of social disapproval by peers among communities of Uruguayan small-scale fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We combined this treatment with an in-group (groups from a single community) / mixed group (groups composed of fishers from different communities) treatment. We find that mixed groups, unlike in-groups, reduce their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment. Both in in-groups and mixed groups there is substantial antisocial punishment, which leads to increased extraction of the CPR by those who are unfairly punished. These findings indicate that effective peer punishment requires coordination to prevent antisocial targeting and to clarify the social signal conveyed by punishment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2015-12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Field Experiments
Thema
social disapproval
social preferences
common pool resource
desaprobación social
preferencias sociales
recurso de uso común

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
de Melo, Gioia
Piaggio, Matías
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • de Melo, Gioia
  • Piaggio, Matías
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)