Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations

Arbeitspapier

We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-07

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: public goods ; punishment ; reward ; endogenous institutional choice ; voting ; experiment ; Kollektives Handeln ; Spieltheorie ; Öffentliches Gut ; Kooperation ; Gruppenentscheidung ; Partizipation ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sutter, Matthias ; Haigner, Stefan ; Kocher, Martin G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71938
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET